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Clustering-based data masking approaches are widely used for privacy-preserving data sharing 
and data mining. Existing approaches, however, cannot cope with the situation where confidential 
attributes are categorical. For numeric data, these approaches are also unable to preserve 
important statistical properties such as variance and covariance of the data. We propose a new 
approach that handles these problems effectively. The proposed approach adopts a minimum 
spanning tree technique for clustering data and a micro-perturbation method for masking data. 
Our approach is novel in that it (i) incorporates an entropy-based measure, which represents the 
disclosure risk of the categorical confidential attribute, into the traditional distance measure used 
for clustering in an innovative way; and (ii) introduces the notion of cluster-level micro-
perturbation (as opposed to conventional micro-aggregation) for masking data, to preserve the 
statistical properties of the data. We provide both analytical and empirical justification for the 
proposed methodology. 
Keywords:  Data privacy, data mining, minimum spanning tree, microaggregation, data perturbation 
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Introduction 
As data-sharing and data-mining technologies are being increasingly used in areas such as medical and healthcare 
research, counter-terrorism, credit and loan evaluation, and customer relationship management, there are growing 
concerns about their threats to individual privacy. A study by the US General Accounting Office (2004) reported 
that 61% of the data mining projects run by federal agencies used personal information, and 67% of the data mining 
projects from the private sectors involved personal information. In the healthcare industry, there has been a rapid 
growth of computerization of healthcare records, and over 70 million Americans have some portion of their medical 
records in electronic format (Kaelber 2008). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 includes $20 
billion funding for facilitating electronic medical records (EMR). This rapid transition towards EMR and data 
sharing has raised pressing concerns about privacy. Indeed, there is evidence that EMR has caused medical identity 
theft to increase considerably (Dixon 2006). 
Mishandling of privacy issues can seriously hurt an organization’s credibility and reputation. In a widely-publicized 
incident, AOL released on its website in August 2006 a file containing 20 million search queries for over 650,000 
users. According to AOL, the intention was to provide data for research into online browsing behavior. The 
identities of the users were not included in the data; however, it was soon found that many users in the file could be 
easily re-identified. This caused such fierce public protests, including several law suits and legal complaints against 
AOL, that AOL removed the data from the website within days (Zeller 2006). Concerns about privacy have also 
caused data quality and integrity to deteriorate. According to Teltzrow and Kobsa (2004), 82% of online users have 
refused to give personal information and 34% have lied when asked about their personal habits and preferences. 
Various approaches have been proposed to address the public’s concerns about privacy (Adam and Wortmann 1989; 
Aggarwal and Yu 2008). A conventional approach is query restriction, which focuses on designing statistical 
databases and forming restrictions for accessing confidential data (Chowdhury et al. 1999; Gopal et al. 2002; 
Garfinkel et al. 2002). When the data released is for data mining and statistical analysis, a dataset containing 
individual records is usually required. In this situation, query restriction methods are not applicable and the common 
practice is to mask the data before it is released. Data masking methods broadly include noise-based perturbation, 
which adds noise to the sensitive data to disguise their true values (Agrawal and Srikant 2000; Liew et al. 1985; 
Traub et al. 1984); data swapping, which involves exchange of attribute values between different records (Dalenius 
and Reiss 1982; Reiss 1984; Li and Sarkar 2006b); and generalization and suppression, which generalizes the 
original values to a higher level category or removes the values if generalization is inappropriate (Samarati 2001; 
Sweeney 2002; Cox 1980). All these methods attempt to preserve the utility of the masked data, as measured by 
various data quality metrics. 
From a privacy viewpoint, the attributes of data on individuals can be classified into three categories: (i) explicit 
identifiers, which can be used to directly identify an individual, including name, social security number, phone 
number, and credit card number; (ii) confidential attributes, which contain private information that an individual 
typically does not want revealed, such as salary, medical test results, and sexual orientation; and (iii) non-
confidential attributes, which are normally not considered as confidential by individuals, such as age, gender, race, 
education, and occupation. However, the values of some of these attributes can often be used to identify individuals 
by matching data from different sources, resulting in identity disclosure. Such attributes are called quasi-identifier 
(QI) in the literature. For example, Sweeney (2002) found out that 87% of the population in the United States can be 
uniquely identified with three attributes – gender, date of birth, and 5-digit zip code – which are accessible from 
voter registration records available to the public. In privacy-preserving data mining research, it is typically assumed 
that the explicit identifiers have already been removed from the data. Data masking is applied to QI or confidential 
attributes. We assume the same setting in this study. 
A method for data privacy protection, called k-anonymity (Samarati 2001; Sweeney 2002), has recently gained 
considerable popularity. The basic idea behind k-anonymity is to mask the values of the QI attributes such that the 
values of these attributes for any individual matches those of at least k – 1 other individuals in the same dataset. In 
this way, the identity of an individual is expected to be better protected. However, it is still likely for an intruder to 
discover the confidential information of individuals in the k-anonymized data (Machanavajjhala 2006). The problem 
is that k-anonymity protects identity disclosure by generalizing different but similar QI attribute values into the same 
value. The new values produced by the generalization operation are still correct with respect to the generalized 
categories. Since confidential attribute values remain unchanged in k-anonymity, individuals in a group, who have 
the same generalized QI values, are subject to high disclosure risk if their confidential values in the group are the 
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same. Further, k-anonymity focuses primarily on categorical data. When an attribute is originally captured in 
numeric form, the technique converts its values into intervals and then treats the intervals as categorical values. 
A popular approach for masking numeric data is to use a clustering-based technique. A typical representative of this 
approach is microaggregation, which masks data by first clustering the data into groups of similar records and then 
replacing the QI or confidential attribute values with a group-level aggregated value. The basic idea of 
microaggregation in terms of disclosure protection is similar to that of k-anonymity (with the distinction that the 
former applies to numeric data while the latter to categorical data). Univariate microaggregation (Defays and 
Nanopoulos 1993) involves sorting records by each attribute to be masked, clustering adjacent records into groups of 
small sizes, and replacing the individual values in each group with the group average. Univariate microaggregation 
does not consider the relationships between attributes; so the masked data might not be appropriate for data mining. 
Multivariate microaggregation groups data using a clustering technique that is based on a multi-dimensional 
distance measure (Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz 2002; Laszlo and Mukherjee 2005). As a result, the 
relationships between attributes are expected to be better preserved. Li and Sarkar (2006a) propose a clustering-
based method for masking numeric data using a kd-tree technique, which is more efficient than the multivariate 
microaggregation method. A limitation of these clustering-based approaches is that they apply primarily to numeric 
data. When categorical confidential data are present, a clustering-based approach can increase the disclosure risk of 
the confidential data. This problem is similar to the confidential value disclosure problem in k-anonymity mentioned 
above. We illustrate this situation in detail in the next section. Due to its nonparametric nature, another criticism 
leveled against clustering-based approach is that it lacks analytical justification for preserving statistical properties 
of the data (Winkler 2007). 
In this study, we examine the problem of using microaggregation when categorical confidential data are present. We 
propose a new method that effectively protects or limits identity and confidentiality disclosure in this situation. The 
proposed approach adopts a minimum spanning tree (MST) technique for clustering data and takes into account the 
disclosure risk of the categorical confidential attribute when forming data groups. To reduce identity disclosure risk, 
our approach uses a micro-perturbation method that perturbs the numeric non-confidential data at a cluster level. 
Together, the clustering and micro-perturbation methods ensure that the statistical properties of the original data are 
well preserved. The main contributions of this research are summarized as follows: 
• The originality of the problem. This research is the first one to investigate the privacy problem that arises when a 
clustering-based approach is used to mask numeric data with categorical confidential data. We demonstrate that 
the disclosure risk of the confidential data can increase in such a situation. 
• The novelty of the approach. Our approach is novel in that (i) it incorporates an entropy-based measure, which 
represents the disclosure risk of the categorical confidential attribute, into the traditional distance measure in an 
innovative way for clustering data; and (ii) it introduces the notion of cluster-level micro-perturbation (as opposed 
to conventional micro-aggregation) for masking data, which is new to the literature. 
• Theoretical justification of the methodology. Many of the existing data masking methods are parametric, 
depending on assumptions about the properties of the data, such as normality or monotonicity. Current 
nonparametric approaches lack theoretical results to justify their validity. We show that the mean vector and 
covariance matrix of the masked data generated using the proposed micro-perturbation method are unbiased 
estimates of the true mean vector and covariance matrix. These results are true not only for the clustering method 
proposed in this research, but also for any other clustering-based technique if the micro-perturbation method is 
used. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the confidentiality disclosure problem 
that can occur when applying a clustering-based technique for data masking, and propose entropy-based measures to 
represent the disclosure risk. In the follow-up section, we develop the MST-based algorithm for clustering data with 
confidential class restriction. The micro-perturbation method and its theoretical justification are elaborated 
subsequently. We then describe a set of experiments conducted on real-world datasets. The final section concludes 
the paper and provides directions for future research. 
Class Restricted Microaggregation Problem 
Microaggregation involves partitioning a dataset of N records into groups such that each group contains at least m 
records. That is, 
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where G is the number of groups and gn  is the number of records in group g. The purpose of partitioning data into 
groups is to use the group-level aggregated data in place of individual values for data release. As such, 
microaggregation attempts to minimize information loss due to the aggregation, subject to the group size constraint. 
Let ),...,1;,...,1( Ggni ggi ==x  be the ith record in group g and gx  be the mean vector for group g. The 
information loss can be measured using the within-group sum of squared errors: 
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For a given dataset, the total sum of squared errors, 







)()( XxXx ,             (3) 
is a constant (where X  is the overall mean vector). It is then more convenient to use SSE/SST, which is a value 
between 0 and 1, for measuring information loss. Therefore, microaggregation problems can be viewed as 
minimizing SSE/SST subject to the group size constraint in (1). 
To prevent re-identification disclosure, microaggregation typically masks the values of the QI attributes (similar to 
k-anonymity), while keeping the confidential attribute values unchanged. When the confidential attributes are 
categorical, however, this approach is problematic. For simplicity, we consider only a single categorical confidential 
attribute, which we call the class attribute. 
 
Figure 1.  An Illustrative Example for Clustering 
To illustrate the problem, consider an example dataset containing nine patient records. There are two numeric QI 
attributes, Age and Weight, and one class attribute, Test Result, with two values: positive and negative. The nine 
data points are plotted in Figure 1, where a circle represents ‘positive’ and a square represents ‘negative’. Suppose 
the minimum group size is three. By minimizing SSE/SST (calculated based on Age and Weight only), 
microaggregation (as well as k-anonymity) forms three groups as shown by the loops formed by solid lines, since the 
data points are closer to each other within each group than to the points outside the group. The problem with this 
grouping is that the confidential class value in each group becomes homogeneous. It is easy to infer the test result of 
a patient when it is released along with the corresponding group-average age and weight values. For example, 
consider a privacy intruder who knows the age and weight of the patient represented by the circle having the largest 
Weight 
Age 
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value for Weight (the upper right circle in Figure 1). The intruder can then identify that this patient belongs to the 
group that tested positive, because the centroid (which is released) of this group is the closest, among all groups, to 
that data point, in terms of distance calculated based on age and weight. 
The method we present attempts to cluster the data such that the frequency distribution of the class values within 
each group is as close to the overall distribution as possible. At the same time, we still want to minimize information 
loss as measured by SSE/SST, subject to the group size constraint. A result of three groups with this approach is 
shown by the loops enclosed in dashed lines in Figure 1, where the class distribution for each group is the same as 
the overall class distribution (i.e., 1/3 ‘positive’ and 2/3 ‘negative’). 
When the confidential class attribute is present, the disclosure risk of a record in a group should be viewed as high 
when the records in the group have purer class values, while the risk is low when the class distribution of the group 
is close to the overall class distribution (since knowing this distribution does not help much in determining the class 
value of a record in such a group). To measure the disclosure risk for records in a group with this desired property, 
we first consider a measure, based on the well-known Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) (also known as relative 
entropy, Kullback 1959), as defined below. 
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group g, respectively. The group KL-divergence of g is defined as: 
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KLD is a convex function of f (F is fixed for a given dataset), which attains its minimum value of zero if and only if 
kFf kgk ∀= ,  (Kullback 1959). This property satisfies a requirement for the risk measure described above – the 
disclosure risk should be at the minimum when the frequency distribution of the class values in a group is the same 
as the overall distribution. However, KLD is not a true distance metric because it does not satisfy the properties of 
symmetry and triangle inequality (Lin 1991). It is also difficult to normalize the KLD values because there is not a 
clear way to define the maximum KLD value. Since our problem involves a tradeoff between a distance measure 
(e.g., Euclidean distance) used for clustering data in a traditional way and the group divergence measure, it is 
desirable that this divergence measure also meets the basic property of a distance metric. Given this consideration, 
we propose using the Jensen–Shannon divergence (JSD) measure, first introduced by Lin (1991), as follows. 
Definition 2. The group JS-divergence for group g is defined as: 
    )],(),([
2
1
),( MFKLDMfKLDFfJSD ggg += ,           (5) 
where M is the average of f and F, i.e., GgCkFfM kgkgk ...,,1;...,,1,2/)( ==+= . 
Because JSD is a nonnegative linear combination of two KLD measures, it is also convex and has the same attractive 
property as that of KLD when it reaches the minimum value of zero. In addition, JSD is symmetric and satisfies the 
triangle inequality condition. Furthermore, JSD has an upper-bound of one. Therefore, it can be regarded as a 
normalized distance measure. To illustrate, we calculate the JSD value for each group in Figure 1 as follows: 
Let subscripts 1 and 2 represent the circle and square classes, respectively. Then, 333.09/31 ==F , and 
667.09/62 ==F . For the all-circle group, 
 13/31 circle,-all ==f , and 02 circle,-all =f . 
So, 
 667.02/)333.01(1 circle,-all =+=M , and 333.02/)667.00(2 circle,-all =+=M . 
 585.0)333.0/0log()0()667.0/1log()1(),(circle-all =+=MfKLD . 
 333.0)333.0/667.0log()667.0()667.0/333.0log()333.0(),(circle-all =+=MFKLD . 
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),( circle-allcircle-allcircle-all =+= MFKLDMfKLDFfJSD . 
Similarly, for each of the two all-square groups, 
 191.0),(square-all =FfJSD . 
For each of the groups with one circle and two squares (i.e., enclosed by dashed lines), 
 0),(mixed =FfJSD , 
since )2,1( mixed, mixed, === kFfM kkk . 
The mixed group has the lowest disclosure risk because its class distribution is the same as the overall class 
distribution. The all-circle (positive) group has the highest disclosure risk because its class distribution differs the 
most from the overall distribution. The JSD measure will be used along with the Euclidean distance in our proposed 
class restricted clustering method. 
Class Restricted Minimum Spanning Tree for Clustering 
Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz (2002) have shown that the globally optimal microaggregation problem, as 
characterized by equations (1), (2) and (3), is computationally prohibitive. Several clustering-based approaches have 
been developed to solve the problem efficiently. The objective functions of traditional clustering problems are 
essentially the same as that of microaggregation. The constraints for clustering problems, however, are somewhat 
different from those of microaggregation (which is shown in equation 1). For instance, the well-known k-means 
clustering approach has an equality constraint on the number of groups, while microaggregation has a lower bound 
constraint on the number of records in each group. As such, k-means clustering is not appropriate for 
microaggregation. Among a few efficient microaggregation algorithms, we are interested in the one proposed by 
Laszlo and Mukherjee (2005), which is based on partitioning a minimum spanning tree (MST). The use of MST for 
data clustering was initially proposed by Zahn (1971). Given a graph of N vertices, a spanning tree contains a group 
of N – 1 edges that connect all vertices of the graph. An MST is a spanning tree with minimum total edge length. 
When the MST is used for data clustering, each vertex represents a data point and the length of an edge is the 
distance between the two related data points. Figure 1 shows an MST with a group of eight edges (line segments). 
In the context of microaggregation, an edge in an MST is said to be removable if all of the subtrees (subgroups) 
formed by cutting this edge contains no fewer than the specified minimum number of vertices (which is m in 
equation 1). The algorithm by Laszlo and Mukherjee (2005) first constructs an MST from the full dataset. It then 
iteratively cuts the longest removable edge in the MST to form clusters for microaggregation. The method, however, 
does not address the confidential class issue. 
In our class-restricted microaggregation problem, there are two objectives. The first is to minimize information loss 
as measured by SSE/SST, which is the same as the traditional microaggregation. SSE/SST is essentially a function of 
the Euclidean distances between different records. In this study, we use normalized Euclidean distances. That is, for 
numeric data, attribute values are normalized to the range [0, 1]; for categorical data, the difference between two 
attribute values is defined as zero if they are the same, and one otherwise (as is the standard practice in clustering). 
The second objective is to minimize the overall class divergence after clustering. This aspect can be captured by the 
JSD measure after the groups are formed. During the construction of an MST, however, it is not known how the 
groups will be structured. Since groups are formed by iteratively cutting the edges in the MST, it is desirable for 
neighboring vertices in the MST to have well-represented class values. This idea is implemented in our proposed 
MST-based algorithm, described next. 
We use Prim’s algorithm (Prim 1957) for building an MST, which expands the tree by adding a vertex with the 
smallest edge length to a vertex already in the partially completed MST. In the process of constructing an MST, let 
e(u, v) be a candidate edge that connects a vertex u already in the partial MST and a vertex v not in the partial MST. 
In Figure 2, for example, vertices 1 through 4 are already in the partial MST (connected by solid lines) while 
vertices 5 and 6 are not. So, u ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and v ∈ {5, 6}. Let u be vertex 2 and v be vertex 5. Then e(2, 5) is a 
candidate edge (out of many possible candidate edges). Prim’s algorithm uses a data structure called priority queues 
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to efficiently identify all candidate edges for a partial MST. The candidate edge with the smallest length is then 
selected and added to the partial MST. Our algorithm follows the same idea in identifying and selecting candidate 
edges except that the edge length is defined as a weighted measure of the Euclidean distance and the JSD distance. 
To compute the JSD distance for a candidate edge, we need to specify a group of related data points. 
 
Figure 2.  An Illustrative Example for Nearest Neighbors 
Let b ≥ 2 be a prespecified number (a natural choice for b would be the group size m). We define the b-nearest 
neighbors of a candidate edge e(u, v) to be a set of vertices that include u, v, and the first b – 2 vertices that are 
encountered by a breadth-first search within the partial MST starting from vertex u (at the beginning, the partial 
MST may contain fewer than b – 2 vertices, in which case all vertices in the partial MST will belong to the nearest 
neighbors). In Figure 2, the 2-nearest neighbors of e(2, 5) are vertices 2 and 5. The 3-nearest neighbors of e(2, 5) are 
either {2, 5, 1} or {2, 5, 3}, depending on which of vertices 1 and 3 is encountered first by the search (the Euclidean 
distance can also be use to break such a tie, but it incurs a slightly higher computational cost). The 4-nearest 
neighbors of e(2, 5) are vertices {2, 5, 1, 3}. Note that even if the Euclidean distance between vertices 2 and 1 is 
longer than that between vertices 2 and 4, the breadth-first search will select vertex 1 instead of 4, because vertex 1 
is closer to vertex 2 in terms of “degree of separation.” We define the nearest neighbors based on the breath-first 
search because records in such a neighborhood are likely to be grouped together eventually when the MST are 
partitioned to form the subtrees (clusters). 
For each candidate edge, our algorithm identifies its nearest neighboring vertices in the partial MST and calculates 
the JSD value based on the class distribution of the corresponding (nearest neighbor) records. Consequently, there 
are two “distance” measures for each candidate edge: the Euclidean distance and the JSD distance. Both distances 
are normalized to have values in range [0, 1]. The class restricted MST is built using a composite measure 
representing the tradeoff between these two aspects. 
Definition 3. Given a partial MST and a candidate edge e, let eL  be the Euclidean distance of e. Let )(eB  represent 
the group of nearest neighbors of e (with a prespecified group size b). The composite distance (CD) of e is defined 
as 
    )()1( eBee JSDLCD αα −+= ,             (6) 
where ]1,0[∈α  is a weight parameter and )(eBJSD  follows from Definition 2. 
The weight parameter α represents the tradeoff between the Euclidean and JSD distances. In general, the larger the 
α value is, the more similar a CD-based MST is to a traditional MST, which implies more emphasis on grouping 
similar data records together and less emphasis on the divergence of the classes in a group. If the class distribution in 
)(eB  is already well represented, then )(eBJSD  will be small and the CD value will depend largely on the Euclidean 
distance. In our MST-based algorithm, the default α value is set to 0.5 to assign an equal weight to the Euclidean 
and JSD distances. 
The CD measure can be used instead of the Euclidean distance to build a class-restricted MST. The measure is 
computed dynamically during the process of MST construction and it depends on the partial MSTs and candidate 
edges. It becomes undefined once the MST is complete. Hence, it cannot be used for cutting the edges of the MST to 
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for our problem it will be more appropriate to use a distance measure that also considers the class distribution. We 
describe such a measure next. 
When a set of data is partitioned, the ensuing subsets typically become more homogeneous in class values. To 
measure this difference in homogeneity before and after partitioning, we define the weighted JSD of a parent group 
as follows. 
Definition 4. Let p be a parent group containing s subgroups, labeled as 1, …, s. Let n and )...,,1( sgng =  be the 
number of records in p and in each subgroup, respectively. The weighted JSD of p is defined as 












),(),( .            (7) 
For example in Figure 1, assuming the parent is the entire dataset, with the subgroups enclosed by the solid-lined 
loops, the weighted JSD is 
  323.0)191.0)(9/3()191.0)(9/3()585.0)(9/3()( =++=⋅pWJSD , 
whereas it is zero with the subgroups enclosed by the dash-enclosed loops. 
The weighted JSD has the following property with respect to the group JSD. 
Lemma 1. The weighted JSD of the subgroups is always larger than or equal to the parent group JSD; i.e., 
    pFfJSDFfWJSD pp ∀≥ ),,(),( .             (8) 
Sketch of Proof. If )(xq  is a convex function of a random quantity x, then it follows by generalizing the notion of 
















gg xqxq λλ .             (9) 
As mentioned earlier, KLD is a convex function. So, it follows by replacing )( gxq  with )(⋅gKLD  and using (4), (5) 
and (7) that the left-hand side of (8) can be represented as the left-hand side of (9). Similarly, the right-hand side of 
(8) can be represented as the right-hand side of (9).                  
With weighted JSD and its property described in Lemma 1, we can define a measure that takes both the Euclidean 
distance and class distribution into account for partitioning the MST. 
Definition 5. Let e be an edge in the MST, eL  be the Euclidean distance length of e, and ep  be the parent group 
before cutting e. The divergence/length ratio is defined as: 








= .           (10) 
The numerator, )()( ⋅−⋅
ee pp
JSDWJSD , is the increase in class divergence due to cutting e, resulting in two 
subgroups. So, er  will be small when the increase in divergence is small and/or the Euclidean distance of e is large. 
Therefore, given an MST, the edge with minimum er  value should be cut first to obtain two subtrees (representing 
two subgroups of data). This process continues for each of the subtrees until no edge is removable (an edge is 
removable if all of the ensuing subtrees contains no fewer than the specified minimum number of data points). This 
will result in clustered data that satisfy the group size constraint in (1). 
Our algorithm, called CREST (for Class REstricted Spanning Tree), is described in Figure 3. In terms of 
computational complexity, Prim’s algorithm for constructing MST is of order )( 2NO , where N is the number of 
records in the dataset. Finding the b nearest neighbors for computing the composite distance takes O(b) time. So, 
Step 1 takes )( 2bNO  time, which is still of order )( 2NO , since b is much smaller than N. The edge-cutting 
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operation in Step 2 involves getting the edge with minimum er  and, if the edge is cut, updating the counts of the 
related records and classes. This step takes O(N) time in the worst case scenario. So, the worst-case time complexity 
for the whole edge-cutting phase (Steps 2 and 3) is of order )( 2NO , which is also the case for the entire algorithm. 
 
 
1. Construct an MST using Prim’s algorithm, where the composite distance defined in (6) is used as the distance 
measure. 
2. Identify the edge in the MST having the minimum er  value. Cut it if it is removable; otherwise, do not consider 
this edge in later iterations. 
3. Repeat Step 2 until no removable edge is available. 
 
Figure 3.  CREST Algorithm 
Micro-Perturbation Approach 
In most clustering-based data masking methods, disclosure control is achieved by replacing the values of a QI or 
confidential attribute in a group with the group-average value of the corresponding attribute (Domingo-Ferrer and 
Mateo-Sanz 2002; Laszlo and Mukherjee 2005; Li and Sarkar 2006a). Taking the average, however, results in a 
reduction in variance and potentially serious distortion in relationships between attributes in the masked data. In 
addition, the subset average tends to be close to some original values in the same subset and thus may not provide 
sufficient protection against disclosure attacks. To overcome these problems, we propose a noise-based micro-
perturbation method that preserves the mean vector and covariance matrix of the data while providing better 
disclosure protection than average-based microaggregation methods. The covariance matrix, which includes 
variance and covariance components, is an important measure of variation in each attribute and of relationships 
between different attributes. 
Noise-based perturbation methods add noise to the original data to disguise their true values. One limitation of this 
approach is that the perturbation mechanisms typically depend on some assumptions about the properties of the data, 
such as normality or monotonicity (Liew et al. 1985; Agrawal and Srikant 2000). This can cause data utility to 
deteriorate when the assumptions are violated. Another limitation is that the variance of the perturbed data is always 
larger than that of the original data. The perturbation methods are usually applied to the entire dataset (Traub et al. 
1984; Agrawal and Srikant 2000), instead of to a partitioned set. Since average-based aggregation reduces variance, 
we introduce a novel approach that adds noise after aggregation to each partitioned group to offset the reduction in 
variance. This idea can be implemented by directly replacing the data for each group using a statistical distribution 
with the mean equal to the group-average and an appropriate amount of noise that essentially preserves the variances 
and covariances of the original data. We provide some important analytical results with regard to the parameters of 
noise to be added at a group level in Theorems 1 and 2 below. 
For convenience, we assume that all non-class attributes are to be perturbed. Let J be the number of non-class 
attributes, G be the number of total groups after clustering, and gn  be the number of records in group g. Let 
)...,,1( JjX j =  be a non-class attribute, )...,,1( Nixij =  be the value of jX  in the ith record, and jX  be the overall 
mean of the jX  values. Let )...,,1( g
g
ij nix =  be the value of jX  in the ith record in group g, and 
g
jx  be the mean of 
the jX  values in group g. For the perturbed data, we replace X with Y in the notation. 




gg xxx  at the group level, then the sample mean vector on the entire perturbed data, Y , is an unbiased 
estimator of the true mean vector µ; i.e., 
     µY =)(E .            (11) 
Proof. For j = 1, …, J, 
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Next, we discuss the covariance parameters for the perturbed data. After all groups are formed, a seemingly 
straightforward approach is to compute sample covariance matrix for each group and then use it in the multivariate 
distribution for generating perturbed data at the group level. This approach, however, is good only if the group size 
m is sufficiently larger than the number of attributes J. But this is often not true for a clustering-based method. When 
Jm < , in particular, the sample covariance matrix becomes singular and unstable, and thus not appropriate for 
generating simulated data. There exist a few estimation methods to deal with the singular covariance matrix problem 
(e.g., Ledoit and Wolf 2003), but none of them is unbiased for the true covariance matrix. We propose an unbiased 
estimator based on the unique nature of the clustering-based approach. 
Let xS  be the sample covariance matrix with its (j, h) element ),( hjjh XXss =  being the covariance between jX  




j xxs  be the (j, h) element of the sample covariance matrix when the original data values are 
replaced by group averages. Theorem 2 below provides group-level covariance parameters for micro-perturbation, 
which results in perturbed data whose sample covariance matrix is an unbiased estimator of the true covariance 
matrix. 
Theorem 2. If perturbed data is generated for each group independently using a multivariate distribution with mean 
vector ]...,,[ 1 ′=
g
J
gg xxx  and covariance matrix 
g
S  whose (j, h) element is 






= ,          (12) 
then the sample covariance matrix based on the entire perturbed data, yS , is an unbiased estimator of the true 
covariance matrix Σ; i.e., 
     ΣS =)( yE .            (13) 
Sketch of Proof. Similar to the decomposition of sum of squares in analysis of variance (ANOVA), the total sum of 
cross-products for the perturbed data can be decomposed as 
  .))(())(())((
1 11 11 1
∑∑∑∑∑∑
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Dividing both sides of (14) by N – 1, we have: 





















),(),( ,          (15) 
where the second term on the right is the within-group covariance that is ignored when replacing the original values 
with group-averages. Taking expectations on both sides of (15), we have, 














+= ,          (16) 
where )],([ gh
g
j yysE  represents the expected covariance within group g, which is the covariance used to generate the 
perturbed data for group g. It follows by taking expectations on (12) and substituting the result in (16) that 
   { })],([)],([)],([)],([ ghgjhjghgjhj xxsEXXsEyysEYYsE −+= . 
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Since perturbed data is generated using gx , 






j xxsEyysE = . 
Therefore, 
   hjXXsEYYsE jhhjhj ,,)],([)],([ ∀Σ== .                
Corollary 1: If perturbed data is generated using the distribution parameters specified in Theorem 2, then the 
sample variances on the perturbed data are unbiased estimates of the true variances. 
The proof follows immediately from the fact that the variances are the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix. 
The micro-perturbation procedure can be implemented by generating perturbed data for each group using a 
distribution (e.g., multivariate normal) with mean vector gx  and covariance matrix gS . The complete algorithm, 
which is called CAMP-CREST (for Clustering And Micro-Perturbation with Class REstricted Spanning Tree), is 
given in Figure 4. Step II of the algorithm takes )(NJO  time, while Step I takes, as explained earlier, )( 2NO  time. 
Since J is much smaller than N, the time complexity for the entire CAMP-CREST algorithm is of order )( 2NO . 
 
 
I. Run CREST algorithm described in Figure 3. 
II. For each group formed from Step I, replace the quasi-identifier attribute values with perturbed values generated 
using a multivariate normal distribution ),( ggN Sx . 
 
Figure 4.  CAMP-CREST Algorithm 
The use of the multivariate normal distribution in generating perturbed data seems to suggest that the perturbed data 
follows a multivariate normal distribution, which would be problematic if the original data is not normally 
distributed. This is not the case, however. The distribution of the perturbed data is dictated by the distribution of the 
clusters, not by the distribution used for micro-perturbation. If we view each cluster geometrically as a packed data 
object in the relevant space, then the joint distribution of these data packs remains the same before and after micro-
perturbation, because perturbation is performed within each pack and, by Theorem 1, the center of each pack 
remains statistically unchanged. The choice of a distribution form for micro-perturbation affects data distribution 
only within each pack, and has no impact on the distribution of the packs. As a result, the joint distribution of the 
entire dataset is reasonably preserved. This is achieved without assuming any knowledge about statistical 
distributions of the original data. If the data indeed follows a multivariate normal distribution, then based on 
Theorems 1 and 2, the original joint distribution is completely preserved, because the statistical properties of a 
multivariate normal distribution can be fully captured by its mean vector and covariance matrix. 
Experiments 
We conducted experiments on three real-world datasets to evaluate the proposed method. The Association for 
Information Systems conducts annual surveys of MIS faculty salary offers (Galletta 2004). We selected the offer 
data from 1999 to 2002 (attributes are consistent for these four years and somewhat different for the other years). 
The dataset consists of 443 records of faculty members who received offers during the period. There are 11 
attributes, including salary offered, position, course load, number of years teaching, region, year indicator, etc. They 
are of numeric, ordinal or binary type and thus can be easily handled by the algorithms used in the experiment. The 
confidential class attribute is salary offered, which was originally numeric. To see the impact of multiple classes, we 
created two versions of datasets based on this data. In the first set, the salary values are grouped into two classes 
with approximately balanced class distributions (called Offer2). The second set has three approximately balanced 
classes (Offer3). 
The second dataset, Diabetes, contains 768 records of female patients, with 9 attributes, including age, number of 
times pregnant, and several numeric medical measures (Asuncion and Newman 2007). The confidential class 
attribute is test result, which has two classes: positive (34.9%) and negative (65.1%). 
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The third dataset, Medicare, contains 4,406 records of individuals who are covered by the Medicare insurance 
program (Deb and Trivedi 1997). It has 22 attributes, including age, gender, race, education, marital status, family 
income, employment status, number of visits to a physician office, number of visits to an emergency room, number 
of hospital stays, and additional health insurance coverage information, etc. The confidential class attribute is 
individuals’ chronic conditions, which has three classes: zero chronic disease (23.3%), one disease (34.0%), and 
multiple diseases (42.7%). All of the non-class categorical attribute values had been preprocessed with 0-1 coding, 
making the data available for numeric operations. 
We compare CAMP-CREST to the standard MST-based microaggregation method by Laszlo and Mukherjee 
(2005).1 The class attribute is not used in constructing the MST. Because Step 1 of the CREST algorithm (Figure 3) 
takes relatively longer time (due to the search for the nearest neighbors) than the remaining part of the CAMP-
CREST algorithm, we also tested an alternative algorithm that replaces this step with a standard MST procedure. We 
call this variant a “Partial CAMP-CREST” algorithm, which relies on Step 2 of the CREST algorithm to obtain 
better group-level class distributions during the MST partitioning phase. For simplicity, we assume all non-
confidential attributes are QI attributes and thus subject to masking. The confidential attributes are not masked. 
We use two measures to assess disclosure risk. The first measure assesses if the class distribution in each group is 
well represented, which relates to the confidential value disclosure risk. The measure is based on the classical chi-
square statistic, defined as: 























,          (17) 
where kN  and gkn  are the number of records with the kth class in the full dataset and in group g, respectively. The 
2
X  statistic measures the closeness between the class distribution of a group and the ideal class distribution for the 
group, averaged over all groups. Clearly, the smaller the 2X  value, the smaller the disclosure risk for the individual 
class values in a group, as the class distribution in the group is closer to the overall class distribution. This measure 
is related to the clustering part of the proposed method. 
The second measure is related to the micro-perturbation part of the proposed method, and it concerns re-
identification risk. This measure, called record linkage, was proposed by Pagliuca and Seri (1999). It uses the 
Euclidean distance between a record shown on an original data file and that shown on the corresponding masked 
file. A record in the masked file is said to be “linked” if the record closest to it in the original file is indeed the 
corresponding unmasked record. A record in the masked file is “second closely linked” if the second closest record 
in the original file is the corresponding one. The record linkage measure is defined as the percentage of records that 
are either “linked” or “second closely linked”. A smaller value for this measure indicates lesser re-identification risk. 
Data quality is measured by information loss due to data masking. Univariate information loss is measured using 
two metrics, average absolute bias in mean (ABIM) and average absolute bias in standard deviation (ABISD). 
Multivariate information loss is measured using average absolute bias in correlation (ABICO). These measures are 
defined below, based on Adam and Wortmann (1989), and Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2001): 











ABIM ,            (18) 











ABISD ,           (19) 
















ABICO ,          (20) 
                                                          
1 We have not selected the microaggregation method proposed by Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz (2002), since 
Laszlo and Mukherjee (2005) have shown that the performance of this method is similar to the MST-based 
microaggregation. 
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where )( jXs  and )( jYs  are standard deviations calculated on the original and masked data respectively, and 
),( hj XXr  and ),( hj YYr  are the correlations between attributes j and h calculated on the original and masked data 
respectively (the number of such correlations is 2/)1( −JJ ). The absolute values are taken in the above definitions 
to prevent positive and negative biases over different attributes from canceling out. A small ABIM, ABISD or 
ABICO value indicates that the means, standard deviations, or correlations for the masked data are on average close 
to those for the original data. Clearly, the smaller the ABIM, ABISD and ABICO values, the smaller the information 
loss in mean, standard deviation and correlation. 
The results of CAMP-CREST and Partial CAMP-CREST vary somewhat with different random number seeds. 
Therefore, these two algorithms were run five times for each dataset, with a new random number being generated 
each time. The average results are reported. Comparisons of different masking methods should be made in terms of 
both disclosure risk and information loss measures. As described above, there are two disclosure risk measures and 
three information loss measures. To facilitate the comparisons across multiple criteria, we used record linkage, 
which measures re-identification risk, as the control factor in the experiments. For each dataset, we adjusted the 
group sizes for the different methods to produce masked data such that the record linkage values for all three 
methods were about the same (to remain on the conservative side we ensured that CAMP-CREST had the smallest 
values). Effort was also made to ensure that no record linkage value from any method is larger than 5% in order to 
provide reasonable disclosure protection. The performances of the three methods are then examined on the 2X  and 
information loss measures. 













Offer2 MST     0.6 4.97 5.07 0 47.84 440.85 
(403 records) Partial CAMP-CREST     0.6 4.83 4.14 2.55   3.44 112.16 
 CAMP-CREST     1.4 4.74 3.59 2.28   2.87 113.71 
Offer3 MST     0.6 4.97 7.70 0 47.84 440.85 
(403 records) Partial CAMP-CREST     0.6 4.97 5.56 2.87   2.74 104.97 
 CAMP-CREST     2.2 4.70 4.88 2.84   3.35   95.20 
Diabetes MST     1.3 2.73 3.08 0 36.44 156.49 
(768 records) Partial CAMP-CREST     1.3 2.68 2.39 1.22   2.63   30.83 
 CAMP-CREST     4.4 2.42 1.77 1.20   2.81   28.42 
Medicare MST   31.8 3.22 3.10 0 39.88 444.68 
(4406 records) Partial CAMP-CREST   33.5 3.19 2.83 2.24   2.08 111.48 
 CAMP-CREST 127.3 2.72 1.95 2.01   2.27 113.77 
 
The results of the experiments are shown in Table 1. The total number of records in each dataset is shown below the 
dataset name. The record linkage rate is obtained by dividing the number of linked records by the total number of 
records in the dataset (note that the data receiver does not know which linked records are indeed correctly matched) . 
For example, the number of linked records with the MST method for Offer2 is 20. It is clear that, for all the datasets, 
the 2X  values associated with CAMP-CREST are substantially smaller than those with the other two methods, 
which indicates, as mentioned earlier, lower confidential value disclosure risk. In most cases, the 2X  values with 
Partial CAMP-CREST are also considerably smaller than those with standard MST. It is also observed from the 
results of Offer2 and Offer3 that the difference in the 2X  values becomes larger when the number of classes 
increases. This is not surprising because the class distribution is likely to be distorted more in this situation if the 
distribution is not considered in the clustering procedure. 
In terms of the information loss measures, CAMP-CREST and Partial CAMP-CREST show small deviations in 
mean (ABIM) on all datasets, which is due to the randomness from simulated data. The approximately 2% 
deviations in mean are generally acceptable in practice (Liew et al. 1985; Aggarwal and Yu 2008). For the ABISD 
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and ABICO measures, both CAMP-CREST and Partial CAMP-CREST significantly outperform standard MST. 
This indicates that the joint distributions of the dataset are better preserved by the proposed methods than standard 
MST. Note that there are only small differences between these two methods in all three information loss measures. 
This is because they both implement the same micro-perturbation approach for the non-class attribute data, on which 
the three measures are computed. 
In terms of computing time, MST and Partial CAMP-CREST are about the same. CAMP-CREST runs several times 
slower than these two algorithms. As discussed earlier, this is due to the search for the nearest neighbors in Step 1 of 
the CREST algorithm (Figure 3). Therefore, for large amounts of data, if runtime is a concern, the Partial CAMP-
CREST can be a good alternative for the complete CAMP-CREST. 
Conclusions and Extensions 
We have presented a confidential-class-restricted clustering and micro-perturbation method for privacy-preserving 
data sharing and data analysis. Our proposed method prevents or limits potential privacy disclosure risks that can 
occur when a traditional clustering-based technique such as microaggregation is used. We have shown analytically 
that the proposed method preserves some important statistical properties of the data regardless of the actual 
distributions of the data. Our empirical study has demonstrated that the method can lead to significantly improved 
performance over existing approaches. The proposed approach has important management and policy implications. 
As data-sharing and data-mining techniques are being increasingly used in areas such as healthcare and medical 
research, crime analysis, database marketing, and customer relationship management, there is a rising public 
sentiment that individual privacy is being severely eroded. Our proposed approach addresses this imperative issue 
and provides a solution to resolve the conflict between data sharing and privacy protection. 
We have assumed in this study that there is only one confidential class attribute in the data. The proposed approach 
can be extended to handle multiple confidential class attributes. We suggest two approaches. The first is to consider 
all confidential class attributes together as one compound class attribute. Suppose, for instance, there is another 
confidential class attribute representing test result for another disease in the example in Figure 1, which also has two 
values: positive and negative. A compound attribute can be created, which would have four categories, formed by 
different combinations of test results for the two diseases. The transformed dataset would have two non-class 
attributes (Age and Weight) and one (compound) class attribute. The proposed method can then be applied to this 
transformed dataset. The second approach is to run CAMP-CREST multiple times, each time dealing with one class 
attribute without considering the remaining class attributes. The micro-perturbed non-class attribute values for each 
record from multiple runs will be different while the values of all class attributes are unchanged. In the final release 
version, an aggregated value (e.g., average) over the results of multiple runs can be used for the respective non-class 
attribute value for each record. 
In this study, we have considered applying an information divergence measure to the MST-based clustering method 
to deal with the confidential class restriction problem. The same idea could also be applied to other clustering 
methods used for microaggregation. We plan to examine such alternative approaches in future. 
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